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Are East Asian companies benefiting from Western board practices? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since the Asian crisis, East Asian nations have strived to introduce corporate 
governance codes, directing companies how to best improve their corporate 
governance practices. However, these codes have not been universally accepted by 
East Asian companies. This study examines the adoption of major board-related 
corporate governance recommendations by large non-financial companies in seven 
East Asian nations and investigates whether improvements in these board governance 
mechanisms have been associated with increased operating performance and market 
value. The results indicate that family-owned companies started with worse board 
governance and have been least likely to improve their board governance since the 
crisis. Overall, bigger, faster growing, non-family-owned companies with less 
concentrated ownership have been more likely to improve their board governance. 
Splitting of the positions of Chairman and CEO, creation of audit and nomination 
committees and improvements in overall board governance were found to have a 
positive relationship with subsequent operating performance and/or market value. 
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Introduction 
After a prolonged period of economic prosperity, the Asian crisis of 1997-98 was 
a major indicator that corporate governance practices in East Asia were in need of 
improvement. Since then, both national and international bodies have formulated and 
issued corporate governance codes and best practice guidelines in an effort to improve 
governance practices in the region. These codes have consistently pushed for 
increased board independence, the separation of the positions of Chairman and CEO, 
and the creation of independent audit, nomination and remuneration committees. 
These mechanisms are expected to improve the corporate governance within a firm 
and decrease the likelihood of expropriation by corporate insiders.  
The recommendations, however, are based on best practice guidelines from the 
US and UK, where ownership structures are diverse and board governance 
mechanisms are already well established. In contrast, East Asian companies have 
concentrated ownership and weak board governance. This means adherence to the 
new recommendations will involve significant board-related changes for most 
companies. This paper examines whether East Asian companies have made these 
changes and determines the characteristics of companies that have made 
improvements to their board governance. 
In addition, prior research has found a strong association between good 
governance and operating performance and firm value (Klapper and Love, 2002; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005; Brown and Caylor, 2005). However, there has been no direct 
evidence that improvements in board-related governance mechanisms are associated 
with better performance and higher value. This study fills this gap, by using panel 
data to relate changes in board governance measures to changes in operating 
performance and firm value. Furthermore, in contrast to recent research, which 
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focuses on broad corporate governance issues, this study concentrates on specific and 
actionable board governance mechanisms. This provides East Asian companies with 
direct evidence as to whether there are benefits associated with improvements in these 
specific corporate governance mechanisms. 
This study examines the largest non-financial companies across seven East 
Asian nations and finds that companies from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, but not Taiwan, have been active in improving 
their board governance since the crisis. Overall, the following types of companies 
were more likely to improve their board governance: bigger, faster growing, non-
family-owned, lower ownership concentration, smaller control-cashflow rights wedge 
and worse prior board governance. Furthermore, the results indicate that board 
governance is important in East Asia. Splitting of the positions of Chairman and CEO, 
creation of audit and nomination committees and improvements in overall board 
governance have a positive relationship with subsequent operating performance 
and/or market value. However, this is not the case for improved board and audit 
committee independence.  
 
Literature Review 
Traditionally, corporate governance was not a priority in East Asia. It was not 
until the Asian crisis that corporate governance was identified as an area in need of 
improvement. During the crisis, stock prices in the region plummeted. On average, 
prices dropped by over 80% in Indonesia, 70% in Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines, 60% in South Korea, 50% in Hong Kong, 40% in Singapore and 30% in 
Taiwan. 1  Academic research has subsequently shown that countries with poorer 
investor protection were hit hardest during the crisis (Johnson et al.,  2000) and that 
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companies with poorer corporate governance performed worse during the crisis 
(Mitton, 2002; Lemmom and Lins, 2003).  
Since then, an abundance of international bodies, including the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank and OECD, and various national agencies have formulated 
and issued corporate governance codes and best practice guidelines to assist 
companies in improving their corporate governance practices. The codes consist of 
recommendations derived from US and UK best practice guidelines relating to board 
composition and function, directors’ duties, disclosure, shareholders’ and 
stakeholders’ rights, and audit and internal control systems. However, unlike the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, the codes in East Asia are voluntary, with companies at 
most having to provide explanation for any deviance from best practice guidelines. 
The first question raised by this research is: Are these recommendations being 
adopted by East Asian companies? Palepu et al. (2002) argue that while most 
countries are now adopting Western (Anglo-Saxon) corporate governance standards, 
there is little evidence that these standards are being widely implemented. Claessens 
et al. (2000) explain that most East Asian companies have concentrated ownership 
structures, with control in the hands of family groups or government entities. East 
Asian companies are also starting from a lower corporate governance level, with 
lower levels of board independence and a relative scarcity of board committees. This 
means that companies will need to expend considerable resources to meet the 
recommendations. So which companies will be willing to bear the costs? 
Previous research indicates that size, growth, profitability, financing needs and 
ownership are all related to the level of corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 
2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black, Jang and Kim, 2005). Larger and more 
profitable companies are more likely to have the resources to spend on corporate 
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governance outcomes. Corporate governance is likely to be more important for 
companies growing quickly and in need of external financing. Companies controlled 
by a family group are less likely to see the benefits of expenditure on corporate 
governance.2 Companies with smaller boards find it easier to agree on implementing 
new corporate governance measures. Also, it may be easier for companies with good 
corporate governance already to improve their practices. Conversely, companies with 
poorer governance may be catching up. Therefore, corporate governance 
improvements are expected to be a function of size, growth, profitability, ownership, 
board size and the prior standard of corporate governance. 
In addition, both survey and empirical evidence indicates that investors are 
willing to pay more for companies with good corporate governance. Surveys 
conducted by McKinsey & Co. indicate that institutional investors are willing to pay 
an average premium of 20 percent for companies with good corporate governance 
(Coombes and Watson, 2000). Academic research indicates that better corporate 
governance has been associated with higher company valuations (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Klapper and Love 2002; Durnev and Kim 2005).3 A similar relationship has also been 
found between corporate governance and operating measures such as return on assets 
(Klapper and Love 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; Larcker, Richardson and Tuna 
2005). Individual governance attributes such as board independence and audit 
committee independence have also been linked to performance and value (Weir, Laing 
and McKnight, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Black, Jang and Kim, 2006). 
This implies that companies improving their corporate governance practices 
should also see improvements in their operating performance and market value. 
However, while recent research has examined the market reaction to new corporate 
governance regulations  (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2005; Li et al., 2004; Jain et al. 
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2005; Zhang 2005; Zimmermann et al., 2005; Anson and Rodriguez, 2005), no study 
has yet directly related improvements in individual corporate governance mechanisms 
to changes in both operating performance and market value. This study intends to fill 
this void, by relating changes in major board-related governance mechanisms, such as 
board independence, the separation of the positions of chairman and CEO, and the 
creation of audit, nomination and remuneration committees, to changes in operating 
performance and market value. 
 
Data 
This study examines the seven East Asian nations of Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.4 The sample comprises 221 
companies that meet the following criteria: (1) top-100 companies by market 
capitalization in each country in 2004, (2) excluding banking, insurance and financial 
holding companies (SIC codes  60 - 64 and 67), (3) Worldscope data available for the 
period 1998-2004, and (4) board data available for the period 1998-2004. The largest 
companies in each country are examined as they are most likely to have the resources 
to improve their corporate governance practices. Data on board and committee 
composition is obtained directly from company annual reports. Annual reports were 
sourced from companies and stock exchange websites. Financial data is from 
Worldscope.  
Table 1 shows the country and industry composition of the sample. The sample 
companies come from Hong Kong (47), Indonesia (9), Malaysia (61), Singapore (34), 
South Korea (10), Taiwan (49) and Thailand (11).5 There is good variation in industry 
participation across the countries, with most companies coming from the consumer 
durables (45), utilities (25) and basic industry (24) sectors. 
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<< Insert Table 1 here>> 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample companies in 2004. Panel A 
details the main financial and ownership variables. Total Assets is measured in 
billions of US dollars. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Return on assets 
(ROA) and one-year sales growth (Growth) are percentages. Leverage is the ratio of 
debt to total assets. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Cash Rights is 
the percentage shareholding of the largest shareholder. Wedge is the ratio of control 
rights to cashflow rights of the largest shareholder following the methodology of 
Claessens et al. (2000).  
On average, companies from South Korea and Hong Kong are larger than those 
from the other countries. Tobin’s Q ratios, ROA and Growth are largely consistent 
across countries with the exception of companies from South Korea, which have 
lower growth and lower Tobin’s Qs. This is not unexpected due to the size of the 
South Korean companies. Debt levels are highest in Indonesia and Thailand at 32 
percent of total assets. Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand have the biggest boards. 
Cashflow rights of the largest shareholder are highest in Indonesia, Hong Kong and 
Malaysia and lowest in Taiwan. The ratio of control to cashflow rights is highest in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Panel B shows that the majority of sample companies in 
Hong Kong (72%) and Taiwan (65%) have family groups as their largest shareholders. 
They are followed closely by Thailand (45%) and Malaysia (41%). In Indonesia, 
Singapore and South Korea the largest shareholders are usually government entities or 
other companies. Overall, just less than half of the sample (108 companies) are 
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family-owned and the remainder (113 companies) are non-family owned. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 here>> 
 
Appendix A presents the board-related corporate governance recommendations 
in each country at the end of 2004.6 Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
all have English common law origins with a single-tier board structure. Indonesia has 
a French civil law origin with a dual-tier board structure.7 South Korea and Taiwan 
have a German civil law origin, with boards in Taiwan consisting of both directors 
and supervisors.8 Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore all recommend that one-third 
of the board of directors be independent, Indonesia recommends 30%, South Korea 
50% for large public companies, Taiwan at least one independent director and 
Thailand recommends a sufficient number of independent directors. All countries, 
with the exception of South Korea, specifically recommend the separation of the 
positions of Chairman and CEO. Singapore recommends all majority independent 
committees. Malaysia and South Korea recommend majority independent audit and 
nomination committees, while Hong Kong and Thailand recommend majority 
independent audit committees. Indonesia recommends some independence for 
nomination and remuneration committees and audit committees independent of 
company insiders. Taiwan only recommends the creation of an audit committee and 
does not specify independence.  
 
Methodology 
As an anchor for the following analysis, the first model relates board governance 
to company characteristics in 1998. This identifies which types of companies had 
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better or worse board governance at the beginning of the sample period. Previous 
research indicates that size, growth, profitability, ownership structure and board size 
are related to the level of corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2002; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005; Black, Jang and Kim, 2005; Lins, 2003). 
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where CGi is the corporate governance measure (board independence (BIND) 9 , 
Chairman/CEO split (CCSPLIT), existence of audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees (AC, NC, RC), audit committee independence (ACIND) and the overall 
board governance score (BOARD)10), SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
US dollars, GROWTH is one year sales growth, ROA is return on assets, CASH is the 
cashflow rights of the largest shareholder, CASH2 is the squared cashflow rights of 
the largest shareholder, WEDGE is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the largest 
shareholder, BLOCK is a dummy variable equal to one if a non-management 
blockholder exists with share ownership of greater than 10 percent, FAMILY is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the largest shareholder is a family group, BSIZE is the 
size of the board of directors and XLIST is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
company has an equity listing on a US stock exchange.11 All continuous independent 
variables are adjusted by the country-year average. This allows for cross-country 
comparison. The regressions also include country dummies to control for cross-
country differences in the governance measures. Ordinary least square regressions are 
used for continuous dependent variables and logit regressions are used for binary 
dependent variables. 
Model 2 then relates changes in board governance measures over the sample 
period (1998-2004) to company characteristics. Size, growth, performance, ownership 
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structure, board size and prior standard of board governance are all expected to be 
related to corporate governance changes. Lagged variables are used as they are more 
representative of the company characteristics in place when board governance 
changes are implemented. As the observations are pooled, continuous independent 
variables are adjusted by the country-year average to allow for cross-country 
comparison. 
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where ∆CGit is the change in the corporate governance measure (BIND, CCSPLIT, 
AC, NC, RC, ACIND and BOARD) during period t and CGt-1 is the level of the 
corporate governance measure at time t-1. Other variables as previously defined. 
Ordinary least square regressions are used for continuous governance changes and 
logit regressions are used for binary governance changes. The regressions also include 
country and year dummy variables and robust standard errors. 
The third model then relates changes in corporate governance measures to 
changes in market value and firm performance. 12  Corporate governance 
improvements are expected to increase firm performance and value. Both current and 
lagged corporate governance changes are included in the model to account for the 
potentially contemporaneous and lagged effects of corporate governance changes on 
firm value and performance.  
it
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where ∆VOIit is the change in the variable of interest (Tobin’s Q (TQ) is the proxy for 
firm value and ROA is the proxy for firm performance) during period t, ∆CGit is the 
change in the corporate governance measure (BIND, CCSPLIT, AC, NC, RC, ACIND 
and BOARD) during period t, ∆CGit-1 is the change in the corporate governance 
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measure during the previous period, ∆CONTROLit are changes in standard control 
variables including SIZE, GROWTH, leverage (LEV), CASH, WEDGE, BSIZE, and 
regression specific control variables such as ROA during period t, and ∆VOIt-1 is the 
change in the variable of interest during the previous period.13 The regressions include 
fixed period effects to control for general economic conditions and robust standard 
errors.14 
  
Results & Discussion 
Table 3 presents the average board governance measures of sample companies 
in each country and for family-owned versus non-family-owned companies from 1998 
to 2004. Due to the small number of observations for Indonesia, South Korea and 
Thailand, only limited conclusions can be drawn for these countries. Panel A shows 
that board independence has increased for all countries since 1998, with the average 
companies in South Korea and Singapore having a majority independent board by 
2004. Companies from Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have increased 
their board independence to over 30 percent on average, but Taiwan still has low 
levels of board independence. A total of 126 companies improved their board 
independence and 31 reduced their board independence over the period, with the 
majority of the changes occurring in non-family-owned companies. As at 2004, 
family-owned companies still had lower board independence than non-family-owned 
companies.  
 
<< Insert Table 3 >> 
 
Panel B shows how the separation of the positions of Chairman and CEO has 
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evolved over the period. There is evidence of small upward and downward changes in 
the separation of the positions in Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, with only Hong 
Kong having seen an upward trend in the splitting of these two key positions over the 
period. In all, 11 companies split the Chairman and CEO positions over the period and 
six combined the positions. As at 2004, family-owned companies were still less likely 
to have the positions split than non-family-owned companies. 
Panels C, D and E show the existence of audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees across the period. By 2004, nearly all companies had established audit 
committees, with the exception being companies from Taiwan.15  Nomination and 
remuneration committees have become increasingly popular over the period, being 
most prolific in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and least prolific in Taiwan. All 
three panels indicate that family-owned companies were less likely to have 
established these committees than non-family-owned companies.  
Panel F shows changes in audit committee independence over the period. Most 
companies have either created majority independent audit committees or maintained 
majority independent audit committees since 1998. Only Indonesia and Singapore 
have seen large upward trends in their audit committee independence over the period. 
There is little difference between family-owned and non-family-owned companies as 
it seems that family-owned companies that do establish audit committees, maintain 
majority independent committees.16 
Panel G presents the results for the overall board governance score. This is 
computed as follows: one point for each independent director, one point for 
Chairman/CEO split and one point for each board committee (audit, nomination and 
remuneration). 17  Overall, companies from most countries have seen substantial 
improvement in their overall board governance scores. The exception being 
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companies from Taiwan, which have seen only a slight improvement. In total, 161 
companies improved their board governance and five companies saw their board 
governance deteriorate between 1998 and 2004. 18  As at 2004, family-owned 
companies still had weaker board governance than non-family-owned companies.  
Table 4 reports the results for model 1, which examines the determinants of 
board governance in 1998. This provides an anchor for the following analysis by 
indicating which types of companies already had strong board governance in 1998.19 
The results indicate that larger companies, non-family-owned companies, companies 
with smaller boards and companies with less concentrated ownership had higher 
board independence in 1998. Smaller companies, non-family-owned companies and 
companies with bigger boards were more likely to have split the positions of 
Chairman and CEO. Non-family-owned companies, companies with a non-
management blockholder and companies not cross-listed were more likely to have 
established audit committees.20 Larger companies, companies with moderately lower 
ownership concentration and companies without a non-management blockholder were 
more likely to have established a remuneration committee. Finally, larger companies, 
non-family-owned companies, companies with a lower wedge between control and 
cashflow rights and companies with bigger boards had better overall board 
governance.21 No notable results were found for nomination committees and audit 
committee independence. This preliminary analysis indicates that by 1998 larger 
companies had already established stronger board governance and that family-owned 
companies were already lagging behind. This is consistent with the findings of 
previous research (Klapper and Love, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black, Jang and 
Kim, 2005). 
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<< Insert Table 4 >> 
 
Table 5 reports the results for the second model, which relates board governance 
changes to company characteristics. The first regression shows that changes in board 
independence are positively related to firm size and ROA, and negatively related to 
family ownership, the control-cashflow rights wedge, board size, and the prior level 
of board independence. The third regression shows that the creation of audit 
committees is negatively related to the cashflow rights of the largest shareholder and 
the existence of a non-management blockholder. The sixth regression shows that 
changes in audit committee independence are negatively related to the cashflow 
ownership of the largest shareholder, the control-cashflow rights wedge, and the prior 
level of audit committee independence. The final regression shows that an 
improvement in overall board governance is positively related to firm size and growth 
and negatively related to the cashflow ownership of the largest shareholder, the 
control-cashflow rights wedge, family ownership, board size and the prior level of 
board governance. There were no significant results in the other regressions.  
 
<< Insert Table 5 >> 
 
Overall, a number of conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, on 
average, companies that started the period with worse board governance are catching 
up to those with better board governance practices. Therefore, it does appear that 
corporate governance codes have enticed the average firm to improve their board 
governance. Second, family-owned companies started with worse board governance 
and did not close the gap on non-family-owned companies. If anything, the gap 
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between the overall board governance of family-owned and non-family-owned 
companies actually widened over the period. This indicates that family-owned 
companies are intentionally not improving their board governance to the level of non-
family-owned companies in order to retain private benefits of control. This is 
consistent with Dahya et al. (2006) who find that only dominant shareholders not 
worried about their loss of perquisites will maintain stronger boards. It also indicates 
that corporate governance code recommendations have not been effective in 
improving board governance in family-owned companies. Third, bigger, faster 
growing companies with smaller boards, lower cashflow ownership and a smaller 
control-cashflow rights wedge were more likely to improve their overall board 
governance. Bigger and faster growing companies are more likely to need financing 
from external stakeholders, where improved board governance enhances transparency 
and credibility. Smaller boards may find it easier to agree on implementing board 
governance improvements than larger boards. Lower cashflow ownership and a 
smaller control-cashflow rights wedge indicate less concentrated ownership, which 
means less resistance from owners in implementing board governance changes. 
Model 3 then relates changes in the board governance measures to changes in 
firm value and operating performance. As the models include fixed period effects, any 
significant results here are not attributable to period-specific conditions, such as bull 
or bear markets. Table 6 reports the results for the model relating changes in the board 
governance measures to changes in Tobin’s Q. After controlling for other factors 
affecting a change in the Tobin’s Q ratio, a significant positive association is found 
between firm value and the creation of remuneration committees. This could indicate 
that the creation of remuneration committees is rewarded with increased firm value or 
that remuneration committees are created during periods of share price growth. A 
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significant negative association is found between firm value and board independence. 
Similarly, this could indicate that increased board independence results in lower share 
prices or that board independence is increased during periods of declining share prices. 
Positive lagged relationships are found between firm value and the splitting of the 
positions of Chairman and CEO and the creation of audit and nomination committees. 
This indicates that splitting the two key leadership positions and the creation of audit 
and nomination committees are followed by a year of share price growth.  
 
<< Insert Table 6 >> 
 
Table 7 presents the results for the model relating changes in the board 
governance measures to changes in operating performance (ROA). After controlling 
for other factors affecting a change in ROA, a significant positive relationship is 
found between operating performance and the splitting of the positions of Chairman 
and CEO, the creation of nomination and remuneration committees, and overall board 
governance. This could indicate that these board governance improvements result in 
better operating performance or that when operating performance is high these 
governance improvements are more likely to be implemented. A negative relationship 
is found between operating performance and the creation of audit committees. Once 
again this could indicate that the creation of audit committees results in lower 
operating performance or that audit committees are more likely to be created during a 
year of poor operating performance. Positive lagged relationships are found between 
operating performance and the splitting of the positions of Chairman and CEO, the 
creation of nomination committees and overall board governance. This indicates that 
improvements in board governance, especially the splitting of the Chairman/CEO 
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position and the creation of nomination committees, are followed by a period of 
improved operating performance.  
 
<< Insert Table 7 >> 
 
Put together, the implications of Tables 6-7 are as follows. First, splitting of the 
Chairman and CEO positions, creation of nomination committees and improvements 
in overall board governance are associated with improved operating performance in 
the current and next periods. This indicates a strong relationship between 
improvements in these board governance measures and improved operating 
performance. Second, splitting of the Chairman and CEO positions and creation of 
audit and nomination committees are followed by a year of share price growth. This 
shows that companies are not immediately rewarded for improving these board 
governance mechanisms but are rewarded once the effect of their implementation has 
been felt. Third, the creation of remuneration committees is associated with increased 
value and operating performance, and the creation of audit committees is associated 
with lower operating performance. This may mean that companies are immediately 
rewarded for creating remuneration committees or that companies tend to create 
remuneration committees during periods of strong performance and share price 
growth and create audit committees during a period of poor operating performance. If 
this is the case then companies may be establishing these committees at opportunistic 
times. Fourth, improvements in board independence are associated with lower market 
value and are followed by a year of lower operating performance, and improved audit 
committee independence has not relationship with value and performance. The clear 
result here is that improved board independence and audit committee independence 
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does not have a positive effect on operating performance and firm value. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper examines which East Asian companies have improved their board-
related corporate governance measures in the years since the Asian crisis and whether 
these improvements have been associated with better operating performance and 
increased market value. Unlike previous research, the focus of this study is on 
individual board governance measures and not a broad corporate governance index. 
While a broad corporate governance index is a wider measure of firm governance 
quality, it does not provide identifiable and actionable ways for companies to improve 
their corporate governance. This research provides East Asian companies with direct 
evidence as to whether there are benefits associated with improvements in specific 
board governance measures. 
The results can be summarized as follows. By 1998, larger companies had 
already established stronger board governance and family-owned companies were 
already lagging behind. Over the period 1998 to 2004, companies from Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, but not Taiwan, have been 
active in improving their board governance. Overall, the following types of 
companies were more likely to improve their board governance: bigger, faster 
growing, non-family-owned, lower ownership concentration, smaller control-
cashflow rights wedge and worse prior board governance. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that board governance is important in East Asia. 
Splitting of the Chairman and CEO positions, creation of nomination committees and 
improvements in overall board governance are associated with improved operating 
performance in the current and next periods. Also, splitting of the Chairman and CEO 
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positions and creation of audit and nomination committees are followed by a year of 
increased firm value. However, this is not the case for improved board and audit 
committee independence. 
There are a number of implications of these results. First, companies that started 
the period with worse board governance are catching up to those with better board 
governance practices. Therefore, it does appear that corporate governance codes and 
other regulations have enticed the average firm to improve their board governance. 
However, there seems to be cultural or institutional factors in Taiwan that are keeping 
Taiwanese companies from significantly improving their board governance. Second, 
family-owned companies started with worse board governance and have been least 
likely to improve their board governance since the crisis. Therefore, another approach 
needs to be found to entice family-owned companies to improve their governance 
practices. Third, the results indicate that board governance is important in East Asia. 
Splitting of the positions of Chairman and CEO, creation of audit and nomination 
committees and improvements in overall board governance have a positive 
relationship with subsequent operating performance and/or market value. Therefore, 
East Asian companies now have direct evidence that there are benefits to 
implementing these specific board governance mechanisms. 
 
Appendix A – Board-Related Corporate Governance Code Recommendations 
Board-related corporate governance code recommendations in each country at the end of 2004. Data sourced from corporate governance codes 
and other regulations for each country on the Asian Corporate Governance Association website. Board size and independence in Taiwan does not 
include supervisors. In Indonesia, board data refers to the Board of Commissioners. 
 
 Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand 
Board Independence 1/3 30% 1/3 1/3 50% >=1 director Sufficient 
Chairman/CEO 
separation Yes Mandatory Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Audit committee Majority independent 
Independent 
of directors* 
Majority 
independent 
Majority 
independent 
Majority 
independent Yes 
Majority 
independent 
Nomination committee Yes Some independence 
Majority 
independent 
Majority 
independent 
Majority 
independent - Yes 
Remuneration committee Yes Some independence Yes 
Majority 
independent Yes - Yes 
* Directors in Indonesia are the equivalent of company executives. 
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Table 1 – Country and Industry Composition 
 
 Country of Origin  
Industry Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand Total 
Oil 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 6 
Consumer Durables 4 2 7 11 2 18 1 45 
Basic Industry 2 3 7 3 1 7 1 24 
Food & Tobacco 5 1 12 2 0 2 0 22 
Construction 3 0 7 0 1 4 1 16 
Capital Goods 2 0 2 0 0 9 0 13 
Transportation 7 0 3 3 1 5 1 20 
Textiles & Trade 5 0 3 1 0 2 2 13 
Services 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 7 
Leisure 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 9 
Utilities 7 2 7 2 3 1 3 25 
Land Development 11 0 6 4 0 0 0 21 
Total 47 9 61 34 10 49 11 221 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A – Financial and Ownership Variables 
 Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand 
Total Assets 7.69 2.03 1.40 2.70 27.19 3.53 2.08 
Tobin’s Q 1.80 1.49 1.62 1.47 1.19 1.47 1.59 
ROA (%) 10.11 14.16 9.75 14.24 11.76 10.36 10.85 
Growth (%) 12.90 24.47 11.01 15.87 4.22 17.86 9.06 
Leverage 0.21 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.26 0.32 
Board Size 12.47 6.67 8.85 9.44 11.80 9.48 12.18 
Cash Rights 0.41 0.53 0.40 0.37 0.22 0.16 0.33 
Wedge 1.47 1.17 1.32 1.22 1.00 1.45 1.12 
Mean statistics of sample companies by country in 2004. Total Assets are in billions of US dollars. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total 
assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets. Growth is one 
year sales growth. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Cash Rights is the 
percentage shareholding of the largest shareholder. Wedge is the ratio of control rights to cashflow rights of the largest shareholder 
(Claessens et al., 2000). ROA and Growth are percentages. Data sourced from Worldscope and company annual reports. 
 
Panel B – Largest Owners of Sample Companies 
 Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand 
Family 72% 12% 41% 29% 10% 65% 45% 
Company 0% 44% 21% 24% 70% 14% 36% 
Government 26% 44% 25% 38% 10% 6% 19% 
Other 2% 0% 13% 9% 10% 15% 0% 
Largest shareholders of sample companies by country in 2004. Largest shareholders include founding families, companies, 
government agencies and others (individuals, co-founders and other organizations). Data sourced from company annual reports. 
Table 3 – Board Governance Measures 1998-2004 
 
Panel A – Board Independence (BIND) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33 29 16 
Indonesia 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.37 0.39 0.40 8 1 
Malaysia 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.41 43 8 
Singapore 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.53 21 5 
South Korea 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.60 7 1 
Taiwan 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 10 0 
Thailand 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.36 8 0 
Family 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27 52 13 
Non-family 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.40 74 18 
Average proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. The plus (+) and minus (-) 
columns represent the number of companies with positive or negative changes over the period. Data 
sourced from company annual reports. 
 
Panel B – Chairman/CEO Separation (CCSPLIT) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.74 0.77 7 1 
Indonesia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 0 
Malaysia 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.83 2 1 
Singapore 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.82 2 2 
South Korea 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0 1 
Taiwan 0.86 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.83 0 1 
Thailand 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 0 
Family 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.76 4 2 
Non-family 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.88 7 4 
Proportion of companies with the positions of Chairman and CEO separated. The plus (+) and minus (-) 
columns represent the number of companies with positive or negative changes over the period. Data 
sourced from company annual reports. 
 
Panel C – Audit Committee (AC) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 0.55 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.98 20 0 
Indonesia 0.22 0.22 0.44 0.77 0.88 0.88 1.00 7 0 
Malaysia 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 0 
Singapore 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 0 
South Korea 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.80 6 0 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.08 4 0 
Thailand 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 0 
Family 0.53 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.70 18 0 
Non-family 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.87 20 0 
Proportion of companies with an audit committee. The plus (+) and minus (-) columns represent the 
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number of companies with positive or negative changes over the period. Data sourced from company 
annual reports. 
 
Panel D – Nomination Committee (NC) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.23 11 0 
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.44 0.44 4 0 
Malaysia 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.60 0.79 0.79 0.79 47 0 
Singapore 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.41 0.76 0.94 0.94 28 0 
South Korea 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.50 0.70 0.70 4 0 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.55 0.64 0.73 6 0 
Family 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.34 34 0 
Non-family 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.38 0.57 0.63 0.65 66 0 
Proportion of companies with a nomination committee. The plus (+) and minus (-) columns represent 
the number of companies with positive or negative changes over the period. Data sourced from 
company annual reports. 
 
Panel E – Remuneration Committee (RC) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.45 17 0 
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.66 0.66 6 0 
Malaysia 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.64 0.79 0.79 0.79 44 0 
Singapore 0.44 0.47 0.53 0.68 0.85 0.97 0.97 18 0 
South Korea 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 3 0 
Taiwan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 1 0 
Thailand 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.55 0.73 0.82 6 0 
Family 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.44 38 0 
Non-family 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.46 0.55 0.65 0.68 57 0 
Proportion of companies with a remuneration committee. The plus (+) and minus (-) columns represent 
the number of companies with positive or negative changes over the period. Data sourced from 
company annual reports. 
 
Panel F – Audit Committee Independence (ACIND) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.88 7 2 
Indonesia 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.83 0.91 1 0 
Malaysia 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.71 0.73 29 14 
Singapore 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.89 0.90 18 0 
South Korea 1.00 0.92 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.00 0 0 
Taiwan - - - - 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0 
Thailand 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 1 0 
Family 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.83 25 6 
Non-family 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.86 31 10 
 31 
Average proportion of independent directors on the audit committees. The plus (+) and minus (-) 
columns represent the number of companies with positive or negative changes over the period. Data 
sourced from company annual reports. 
 
Panel G – Overall Board Governance (BOARD) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 + - 
Hong Kong 4.49 4.81 5.00 5.11 5.21 5.83 6.28 37 2 
Indonesia 2.44 2.44 2.67 3.44 5.00 5.89 5.89 9 0 
Malaysia 4.81 4.81 4.92 6.09 6.83 6.95 7.04 56 1 
Singapore 6.44 6.38 6.73 7.32 8.23 8.61 8.73 31 0 
South Korea 6.90 7.10 7.40 8.40 8.70 9.70 9.80 7 1 
Taiwan 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.12 1.31 11 1 
Thailand 5.55 5.91 6.00 6.37 6.82 7.55 7.73 10 0 
Family 3.50 3.63 3.67 4.02 4.34 4.68 4.85 69 1 
Non-family 4.80 4.85 5.11 5.83 6.50 6.87 7.06 92 4 
Average overall board governance score. Includes one point for each independent director, 
Chairman/CEO split, and the existence of audit, remuneration and nomination committees. The plus (+) 
and minus (-) columns represent the number of companies with positive or negative changes over the 
period. Data sourced from company annual reports. 
 
 
 
Table 4 –Determinants of Board Governance in 1998 
 BIND CCSPLIT AC NC RC ACIND BOARD 
c 
0.3003 
(0.00) 
1.7762 
(0.00) 
0.8169 
(0.02) 
-4.7447 
(0.00) 
-4.0019 
(0.00) 
0.8853 
(0.00) 
4.7604 
(0.00) 
SIZE
 
 
0.0271 
(0.00) 
-0.2921 
(0.10) 
0.0777 
(0.60) 
0.2286 
(0.57) 
0.4175 
(0.09) 
0.0080 
(0.63) 
0.3193 
(0.00) 
GROWTH
 
 
-0.0003 
(0.43) 
-0.0049 
(0.61) 
0.0019 
(0.81) 
-0.0263 
(0.26) 
0.0052 
(0.67) 
0.0001 
(0.98) 
-0.0037 
(0.47) 
ROA
 
 
-0.0001 
(0.96) 
0.0059 
(0.82) 
-0.0029 
(0.88) 
0.0350 
(0.50) 
0.0093 
(0.78) 
-0.0020 
(0.41) 
0.0063 
(0.61) 
CASH -0.1201 (0.03) 
-2.2653 
(0.12) 
0.6440 
(0.57) 
0.0386 
(0.99) 
-3.8361 
(0.04) 
0.1068 
(0.42) 
-1.0803 
(0.12) 
CASH2 0.1178 (0.53) 
2.7721 
(0.54) 
3.7383 
(0.39) 
6.2090 
(0.40) 
12.8225 
(0.02) 
-1.2882 
(0.00) 
2.3371 
(0.32) 
WEDGE -0.0165 (0.24) 
-0.4718 
(0.15) 
0.1421 
(0.62) 
-1.0843 
(0.49) 
-1.1876 
(0.11) 
0.0164 
(0.68) 
-0.2923 
(0.10) 
BLOCK -0.0267 (0.19) 
0.5407 
(0.33) 
1.0189 
(0.02) 
-0.4961 
(0.62) 
-1.7361 
(0.03) 
0.0331 
(0.47) 
-0.2228 
(0.39) 
FAMILY -0.0329 (0.08) 
-1.1849 
(0.01) 
-0.9436 
(0.01) 
0.4355 
(0.65) 
0.1288 
(0.83) 
-0.0495 
(0.26) 
-0.4519 
(0.06) 
BSIZE -0.0098 (0.00) 
0.1656 
(0.03) 
0.0252 
(0.64) 
0.1331 
(0.24) 
-0.0444 
(0.66) 
0.0046 
(0.56) 
0.1123 
(0.00) 
XLIST -0.0535 (0.22) 
-0.7772 
(0.42) 
-1.6051 
(0.09) 
0.6476 
(0.67) 
-0.3078 
(0.86) 
0.1233 
(0.41) 
-0.8609 
(0.12) 
Adj/McFadden-R2 0.6757 0.1136 0.1396 0.2559 0.3003 0.1461 0.6705 
Regressions relate board governance mechanisms - board independence (BIND), separation of the positions of chairman and CEO (CCSPLIT), existence of an audit 
committee (AC), existence of a nomination committee (NC), existence of a remuneration committee (RC), audit committee independence (ACIND), overall board 
governance score (BOARD) - in 1998 to the following variables – the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars (SIZE), one year sales growth (GROWTH), return on 
assets (ROA), cashflow rights of largest shareholder (CASH), the squared cashflow rights of the largest shareholder (CASH2), control rights of largest shareholder divided by 
the cashflow rights of largest shareholder (WEDGE), dummy variable equal to one if a 10% non-management blockholder exists (BLOCK), dummy variable equal to one if 
the largest shareholder is a family group (FAMILY), size of the board of directors (BSIZE) and a dummy variable equal to one if the company is listed on a US stock 
exchange (XLIST). All continuous independent variables are adjusted by the country-year average. The regressions also include country dummies to control for cross-country 
differences in governance measures – coefficients not reported. OLS regressions were used for continuous dependent variables and logit models were used for binary 
dependent variables. Data sourced from Worldscope and company annual reports.  
Table 5 – Regressions of Changes in Board Governance on Company Characteristics 
 ∆BIND ∆CCSPLIT ∆AC ∆NC ∆RC ∆ACIND ∆BOARD 
c 
0.0472 
(0.00) 
-3.6925 
(0.00) 
-3.5487 
(0.00) 
-3.7368 
(0.00) 
-2.5478 
(0.00) 
0.2137 
(0.00) 
1.0382 
(0.00) 
SIZE
 t-1 
0.0045 
(0.02) 
-0.0034 
(0.98) 
0.0701 
(0.68) 
-0.0458 
(0.68) 
-0.0955 
(0.38) 
-0.0005 
(0.88) 
0.0838 
(0.05) 
GROWTH
 t-1 
0.0000 
(0.16) 
-0.0023 
(0.77) 
0.0001 
(0.96) 
0.0006 
(0.47) 
0.0004 
(0.59) 
0.0001 
(0.41) 
0.0005 
(0.00) 
ROA
 t-1 
0.0002 
(0.02) 
-0.0007 
(0.98) 
0.0189 
(0.27) 
-0.0031 
(0.82) 
-0.0054 
(0.67) 
0.0001 
(0.85) 
0.0010 
(0.69) 
CASH
 t-1 
-0.0314 
(0.00) 
-1.5483 
(0.38) 
-2.0334 
(0.08) 
-1.0148 
(0.15) 
-0.5064 
(0.50) 
-0.0474 
(0.04) 
-0.6544 
(0.00) 
CASH2
 t-1 
0.0515 
(0.19) 
-5.2873 
(0.52) 
-2.2461 
(0.67) 
-0.6315 
(0.82) 
-2.3879 
(0.43) 
0.0861 
(0.29) 
0.9559 
(0.12) 
WEDGE
 t-1 
-0.0047 
(0.05) 
-0.9428 
(0.23) 
-0.3850 
(0.35) 
-0.1620 
(0.53) 
0.1238 
(0.53) 
-0.0137 
(0.00) 
-0.0724 
(0.09) 
BLOCK
 t-1 
0.0018 
(0.28) 
-0.9910 
(0.21) 
-1.0377 
(0.04) 
0.1241 
(0.62) 
0.0711 
(0.77) 
-0.0016 
(0.82) 
0.0076 
(0.85) 
FAMILY
 t-1 
-0.0078 
(0.00) 
-0.4429 
(0.39) 
0.0425 
(0.91) 
-0.3173 
(0.21) 
-0.2440 
(0.35) 
-0.0069 
(0.48) 
-0.2174 
(0.00) 
BSIZE
 t-1 
-0.0020 
(0.00) 
-0.0648 
(0.47) 
-0.1010 
(0.14) 
0.0261 
(0.56) 
0.0754 
(0.09) 
-0.0006 
(0.71) 
-0.0054 
(0.54) 
Lagged level of 
dependent variable 
-0.1224 
(0.00) - - - - 
-0.2347 
(0.00) 
-0.1214 
(0.00) 
Adj/McFadden-R2 0.0975 0.0469 0.0993 0.0910 0.08184 0.1637 0.1232 
Regressions relate changes in board governance mechanisms - board independence (BIND), separation of the positions of chairman and CEO (CCSPLIT), existence of an 
audit committee (AC), existence of a nomination committee (NC), existence of a remuneration committee (RC), audit committee independence (ACIND) and the overall 
board governance score (BOARD) - over the period 1998-2004 to the following adjusted lagged variables – the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars (SIZE), one 
year sales growth (GROWTH), return on assets (ROA), cashflow rights of largest shareholder (CASH), the squared cashflow rights of the largest shareholder (CASH2), 
control rights of largest shareholder divided by the cashflow rights of largest shareholder (WEDGE), dummy variable equal to one if a 10% non-management blockholder 
exists (BLOCK), a dummy variable equal to one if the largest shareholder is a family group (FAMILY), size of the board of directors (BSIZE) and the lagged level of the 
dependent variable. All continuous independent variables are adjusted by the country-year average. Regressions also include country and year dummy variables– coefficients 
not reported. OLS regressions were used for continuous dependent variables and logit models were used for binary dependent variables. Regressions include White standard 
error correction. Data sourced from Worldscope and company annual reports. 
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Table 6 – Changes in Board Governance Measures Related to Changes in Value (TQ) 
 ∆TQ ∆TQ ∆TQ ∆TQ ∆TQ ∆TQ ∆TQ 
Where: (∆CG = ∆BIND) (∆CG = ∆CCSPLIT) (∆CG = ∆AC) (∆CG = ∆NC) (∆CG = ∆RC) (∆CG = ∆ACIND) (∆CG = ∆BOARD) 
c 
-0.0084 
(0.60) 
-0.0131 
(0.39) 
-0.0173 
(0.23) 
-0.0156 
(0.32) 
-0.0235 
(0.12) 
0.0226 
(0.05) 
-0.0089 
(0.52) 
∆CG -0.4008 (0.00) 
0.0883 
(0.28) 
-0.1794 
(0.26) 
-0.0071 
(0.86) 
0.0910 
(0.00) 
-0.1356 
(0.20) 
-0.0151 
(0.18) 
∆CG t-1 
0.1381 
(0.58) 
0.0848 
(0.02) 
0.2704 
(0.08) 
0.0460 
(0.01) 
0.0370 
(0.58) 
-0.0845 
(0.33) 
0.0057 
(0.80) 
∆SIZE
 
 
-0.6432 
(0.00) 
-0.6399 
(0.00) 
-0.6480 
(0.00) 
-0.6450 
(0.00) 
-0.6405 
(0.00) 
-0.4487 
(0.00) 
-0.6475 
(0.00) 
∆GROWTH
 
 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0016 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
∆ROA
 
 
-0.0016 
(0.74) 
0.0016 
(0.74) 
0.0016 
(0.74) 
0.0017 
(0.74) 
0.0016 
(0.75) 
0.0003 
(0.94) 
0.0017 
(0.73) 
∆LEV
 
 
-0.2521 
(0.08) 
-0.2529 
(0.10) 
-0.2344 
(0.14) 
-0.2473 
(0.09) 
-0.2609 
(0.08) 
-0.3096 
(0.03) 
-0.2391 
(0.12) 
∆CASH
 
 
-0.1516 
(0.68) 
-0.1355 
(0.71) 
-0.1435 
(0.70) 
-0.1475 
(0.70) 
-0.1528 
(0.68) 
-0.3231 
(0.25) 
-0.1479 
(0.69) 
∆WEDGE
 
 
-0.0507 
(0.49) 
-0.0483 
(0.53) 
-0.0514 
(0.50) 
-0.0475 
(0.53) 
-0.0461 
(0.55) 
-0.0217 
(0.77) 
-0.0489 
(0.51) 
∆BSIZE
 
 
-0.0071 
(0.54) 
-0.0069 
(0.55) 
0.0058 
(0.66) 
-0.0068 
(0.56) 
0.0072 
(0.51) 
-0.0102 
(0.31) 
-0.0014 
(0.93) 
∆TQ
 t-1 
-0.2793 
(0.01) 
-0.2817 
(0.01) 
-0.2773 
(0.01) 
-0.2809 
(0.01) 
-0.2815 
(0.01) 
-0.2128 
(0.01) 
-0.2802 
(0.01) 
Adj-R2 0.3243 0.3239 0.3288 0.3235 0.3246 0.3639 0.3236 
Regressions relate changes in Tobin’s Q (TQ) over the period 1998-2004 to changes in the following variables – board independence (BIND), separation of the positions of 
chairman and CEO (CCSPLIT), existence of an audit committee (AC), existence of a nomination committee (NC), existence of a remuneration committee (RC), audit 
committee independence (ACIND), overall board governance score (BOARD), natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars (SIZE), one year sales growth (GROWTH), 
return on assets (ROA), leverage (LEV), cashflow rights of largest shareholder (CASH), control rights of largest shareholder divided by the cashflow rights of largest 
shareholder (WEDGE), size of the board of directors (BSIZE) and the lagged dependent variable. The regressions include fixed period effects and White standard error 
correction. Data sourced from Worldscope and company annual reports. 
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Table 7 – Changes in Board Governance Measures Related to Changes in Performance (ROA) 
 ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA 
Where: (∆CG = ∆BIND) (∆CG = ∆CCSPLIT) (∆CG = ∆AC) (∆CG = ∆NC) (∆CG = ∆RC) (∆CG = ∆ACIND) (∆CG = ∆BOARD) 
c 
-1.0618 
(0.00) 
-1.1598 
(0.00) 
-1.0662 
(0.00) 
-1.3125 
(0.00) 
-1.2789 
(0.00) 
-0.7665 
(0.05) 
-1.3443 
(0.00) 
∆CG -0.6990 (0.79) 
2.2464 
(0.05) 
-2.6765 
(0.09) 
1.3022 
(0.00) 
1.1709 
(0.00) 
-0.3616 
(0.83) 
0.4268 
(0.01) 
∆CG t-1 
-6.3290 
(0.00) 
1.1733 
(0.00) 
-0.9583 
(0.54) 
0.5439 
(0.05) 
0.4446 
(0.19) 
-0.5040 
(0.75) 
0.1800 
(0.10) 
∆SIZE
 
 
14.7820 
(0.00) 
14.8757 
(0.00) 
14.7944 
(0.00) 
14.8163 
(0.00) 
14.7843 
(0.00) 
14.4271 
(0.00) 
14.8066 
(0.00) 
∆GROWTH
 
 
0.0320 
(0.00) 
0.0319 
(0.00) 
0.0319 
(0.00) 
0.0320 
(0.00) 
0.0320 
(0.00) 
0.0291 
(0.00) 
0.0321 
(0.00) 
∆LEV
 
 
-34.3648 
(0.00) 
-34.2544 
(0.00) 
-34.3175 
(0.00) 
-34.3805 
(0.00) 
-34.3874 
(0.00) 
-31.2321 
(0.00) 
-34.3138 
(0.00) 
∆CASH
 
 
-1.6104 
(0.69) 
-1.4942 
(0.72) 
-2.2771 
(0.61) 
-1.9332 
(0.66) 
-1.8700 
(0.67) 
-0.4632 
(0.92) 
-1.5940 
(0.71) 
∆WEDGE
 
 
0.1956 
(0.79) 
0.1065 
(0.89) 
0.1048 
(0.90) 
0.1407 
(0.86) 
0.1363 
(0.87) 
0.5173 
(0.34) 
0.1579 
(0.84) 
∆BSIZE
 
 
0.4072 
(0.15) 
0.3913 
(0.18) 
0.4236 
(0.15) 
0.4030 
(0.15) 
0.3975 
(0.17) 
0.5017 
(0.08) 
0.2876 
(0.32) 
∆ROA
 t-1 
-0.3178 
(0.00) 
-0.3207 
(0.00) 
-0.3205 
(0.00) 
-0.3179 
(0.00) 
-0.3179 
(0.00) 
-0.3420 
(0.00) 
-0.3180 
(0.00) 
Adj-R2 0.4964 0.4972 0.4969 0.4968 0.4965 0.4814 0.4967 
Regressions relate changes in return on assets (ROA) over the period 1998-2004 to changes in the following variables – board independence (BIND), separation of the 
positions of chairman and CEO (CCSPLIT), existence of an audit committee (AC), existence of a nomination committee (NC), existence of a remuneration committee (RC), 
audit committee independence (ACIND), overall board governance score (BOARD), natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars (SIZE), one year sales growth 
(GROWTH), leverage (LEV), cashflow rights of largest shareholder (CASH), control rights of largest shareholder divided by the cashflow rights of largest shareholder 
(WEDGE), size of the board of directors (BSIZE) and the lagged dependent variable. The regressions include fixed period effects and White standard error correction. Data 
sourced from Worldscope and company annual reports. 
 
Notes 
                                               
1
 Johnson et al. (2000) provides US-dollar adjusted stock price movements during the crisis. 
2
 Lane et al. (2006) indicate that the new corporate governance recommendations may even be harmful 
to family-owned businesses. 
3
 In East Asia, a positive relationship between corporate governance and market valuation has been 
found in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand (Black, Jang and Kim 
2006; Bai et al. 2005; Campos, Newell and Wilson 2002; Nam and Nam 2004). 
4
 Usable board data from the Philippines is not available. Japan and China are not examined as they 
were less affected by the Asian crisis. 
5
 The small number of sample companies from Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand reflects the 
difficulty in obtaining adequate board data in the countries over the period 1998 to 2004.  
6
 Indonesia introduced its new listing requirements in 2000 and corporate governance code in 2001, 
Malaysia in 2000, Singapore in 2001, South Korea in 1999, Taiwan in 2002, Thailand in 1999 and 
Hong Kong’s original code was introduced in 1993. Hong Kong has also introduced a revised corporate 
governance code effective 2005. 
7
 Indonesian companies have a board of commissioners (equivalent to a board of directors) and a board 
of directors (equivalent to company executives). The two boards are separated by law, so no-one can sit 
on both boards. In this study only commissioners have been included as “directors” in the board 
governance measures. Audit committees in Indonesia also include external members who have not been 
included in audit independence measures. 
8
 In Taiwan, supervisors do not have the right to vote in board matters, but their role is to 
“independently” monitor company activities. In reality, supervisors are usually representatives of 
controlling or block shareholders. In this study supervisors have not been included as “directors” in the 
board governance measures. 
9
 The proportion of independent directors on the board. Directors were only counted as independent if 
the company specifically highlighted the directors as “independent” in the director biography or 
corporate governance sections of the annual reports. Those that supposedly fulfilled independence 
requirements but weren’t identified as “independent” were not included. Directors were traced back 
through time to ensure the latest definition of independence in each country was applied to previous 
periods. Due to the relationship between board independence and board size, the models were also run 
with the number of independent directors in place of board independence. The results were consistent 
with those presented. 
10
 The overall board governance score is computed as follows: one point for each independent director, 
one point for Chairman/CEO split and one point for each board committee (audit, nomination and 
remuneration). 
11
 Non-US companies listed on US stock exchanges (NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX) have been shown to 
have better corporate governance than non-listed companies (Wojcik et al., 2005). 
12
 Change analysis has the potential to overcome a weakness of cross-sectional studies (correlated 
omitted variable problems) by assuming that any undocumented factors determining these variables are 
constant over time. 
13
 Proxies and controls identified from previous research: Yermack (1996), Joh (2000), Yeh, Lee and 
Woidtke (2001), Claessens et al. (2002), Lins (2003), Doidge et al. (2004), Brown and Caylor (2005), 
Larcker et al. (2005). 
14
 To address endogeneity concerns, the model was also run with the control variables as levels instead 
of differences, with no significant changes to the results. 
15
 Most companies in Taiwan report that their supervisors perform a similar function to an audit 
committee. 
16
 This study hasn’t presented changes in remuneration and nomination committee independence over 
the period as this data is not consistently available across all countries. 
17
 This score allows for simultaneous changes in a number of board governance mechanisms. 
18
 The five companies that saw their overall board governance deteriorate from 1998-2004 saw a one 
point drop in their overall board governance score. This was due to a reduction in the number of 
independent directors or the combining of the positions of Chairman and CEO. 
19
 The first and last regressions have high adj-R2 which could indicate multicollinearity. However, the 
high explanatory power is attributable to the inclusion of country dummy variables.  
20
 This is consistent with Davis and Marquis (2005), who find that companies cross-listed in the US are 
unlikely to substantially adopt US-style governance practices. As there is no significant difference 
between cross-listed and non-cross-listed companies, this variable hasn’t been used in later analysis. 
21
 The significant co-efficient on board size is expected as the overall board governance score is a 
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function of the number of independent directors which is usually higher on bigger boards. However, 
removing this variable does not affect the results. 
